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Abstract 
We study panhandling in Downtown Manhattan.  Surprisingly few people panhandle 
there at any given moment: about 8-10 people on average at a busy time, in a small 
area with an economy the size of Latvia’s.  The redevelopment of Ground Zero and the 
resulting surge in economic activity—including the opening of North America’s tallest 
building—changed where panhandlers operated within the neighborhood, but did not 
significantly increase panhandling overall.  The response was muted because the labor 
supply of panhandlers appears to be inelastic.  On the other hand, good places to 
panhandle are relatively abundant.  Hence the benefits of the boom in economic 
activity accrued mainly to incumbent panhandlers themselves; as would the benefits of 
greater donor generosity. 
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 In August 2016, Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull was 
photographed giving a $5 bill1 to a panhandler named Peter on a Melbourne 
sidewalk as the prime minister was about to give a major speech before the 
Committee for Economic Development of Australia.2 As he gave the $5 bill with his 
right hand, a wad of considerably larger bills was visible in his left (Hauser, 2016). 
 The picture went viral.  Almost all comments criticized Turnbull, but 
disagreed violently on what he had done wrong.  Some comments attacked him for 
giving too little:  “Turnbull—a man worth $133 million, a man who carries a stash of 
bank notes in a money clip, a man who donated a cool $1 million to his own election 
campaign—could only spare a fiver to shove in another man’s coffee cup,” wrote 
Erin Stewart in Sydney.  Other comments attacked him for giving anything at all:  
Melbourne Lord Mayor Robert Doyle said that giving money to panhandlers 
entrenches homelessness and that people should donate to organizations that help 
the homeless instead (Hauser, 2016).  Turnbull himself could not explain what he 
had done: “I know people have got different views on that.  But you know, every 
time I see someone in that situation, I always think: There but for the grace of God 
go I.  It was a human reaction, and I’m sorry if that has disappointed some people.  
Maybe they think you should not give money to people who are sitting on the street, 
but I felt sorry for the guy.” 
                                                        
1 Equivalent to about USD$3.75 at then-current exchange rates. 
2 Peter did not give permission for use of his image (Dobbin 2016), and so we do not reproduce this 
photograph. 
 What all the participants in this controversy (except perhaps Peter3) had in 
common was ignorance of the consequences of Turnbull’s act.  Is increased giving to 
panhandlers likely to trigger more panhandling  and more rent-seeking?  Is it likely 
to increase homelessness?  Does it somehow get siphoned off in the long run to 
shadowy figures who control land or some other scarce resource?  Or does it mainly 
benefit people like Peter fairly directly and without large indirect consequences?   
 One reason why the comments could explode so floridly in so many 
directions is that no existing literature explores the consequences of panhandling 
generosity, either theoretically or empirically.  This paper aims to fill that void.  We 
develop a rudimentary model of a panhandling market, and estimate several key 
parameters for downtown Manhattan.  We conclude that if inner Melbourne is like 
downtown Manhattan, Turnbull’s generosity had few, if any, perverse or indirect 
consequences: Peter was better off (he says he used the bill to buy a sausage roll and 
coffee for lunch (Dobbin 2016)), and nothing much else happened (except some 
panhandlers may have moved a few blocks).    
 Our approach and conclusions have many implications beyond judging which 
Australian politicians are worthy of sainthood.  The regulation of panhandling is 
controversial in almost all parts of the developed world, and the discussions we 
have witnessed in the US are as poorly informed as the viral reaction to the picture 
of Turnbull and Peter.  Wise policy can be founded only on the kinds of analysis we 
                                                        
3 Peter said: “It’s a little stingy, because he’s a millionaire, but that’s O.K.  It’s his money, and he 
worked hard for it.” 
do in this paper.  A companion paper (Dordick et al. 2017) explores policy questions 
in more detail. 
 Panhandling also matters because panhandlers are the visible face of 
extreme poverty in developed countries.  Most poor people strive not to be seen or 
recognized as poor, but successful panhandlers must do the opposite; secret 
panhandling is an oxymoron.  In an afternoon’s work, over 10,000 people see the 
average panhandler in downtown Manhattan—as many people as see the average 
professor at work over an entire career.  Public opinion about panhandling may 
affect public opinion about poverty to a degree totally disproportionate to the 
representation of panhandlers among poor people (although Lee and Farrell 2003 
find little evidence that exposure to panhandling correlates with attitudes about 
homelessness).  So public opinion about panhandling ought to be well informed. 
 This paper is based on several summers of research in Manhattan.  Some of 
that research was ethnographic, and some was quantitative—observations of the 
number of panhandlers by place, time, and date.  We draw on both sociological and 
economic literature. 
 We define panhandling as asking passers-by for money for use by oneself 
without offering anything of ostensible value in return.  Thus we exclude musicians 
(however terrible), trinket vendors, mendicant nuns and friars, charity solicitors, 
massage parlor flyer distributors, costumed characters (who pose for pictures and 
ask for money), and naked ladies, for instance. 
 Panhandling is thus a labor market phenomenon—it is defined by what you 
do to get money when you are awake.  It is distinct from homelessness, which is a 
housing market phenomenon—defined by where you sleep.  Often colloquial usage 
confuses the two conditions—for instance, all the media coverage of Turnbull and 
Peter refers to homelessness, not panhandling.  In New York City, a very small 
fraction of homeless people panhandle, and many panhandlers are not homeless. 
Our main finding is that in downtown Manhattan the amount of panhandling 
is primarily circumscribed by the willingness of people to panhandle, not by the 
availability of good places to panhandle.  Every day, panhandling spots that we think 
with good reason are excellent stand vacant (see section 7.5.1 below).  The supply of 
panhandling labor also appears to be inelastic: an influx of potential donors caused 
by an influx of tourists and the redevelopment of Ground Zero and the 
neighborhood in general did not provoke any corresponding influx of panhandlers. 
 Since modest changes in environment seem not to change the prevalence of 
panhandling,4 the incidence of policy changes in places like Downtown Manhattan is 
likely to be pretty simple: a fairly constant group of panhandlers gains or loses; 
there is no “reserve army of panhandlers” to eliminate any rise in returns by 
flooding in, and no shadowy “panhandling boss” behind the scenes to soak up any 
gains by asking more money for right to panhandle in various locations.   
                                                        
4 “Constant prevalence of panhandling” panhandling” does not mean that the same 
people panhandle every day, any more than “constant prevalence of broken arms” 
means that the same people break their arms every day.  The people who panhandle 
change frequently, but our empirical finding is that the number of people who do so 
on any day is relatively impervious to the rewards of panhandling.) 
 
The changes that occurred in Downtown Manhattan, which we take to be 
exogenous to panhandling behavior, allow us to identify labor supply elasticity.  Our 
work is context-specific, not universal.  For instance, on the crowded sidewalks we 
studied, aggressive panhandling is a foolhardy strategy, and we saw none of it. (It 
makes no sense for a panhandler to fixate on a single pedestrian for several minutes 
and thereby ignore or even alienate dozens or even hundreds of other potential 
donors.)  But aggressive panhandling may be profitable in other environments.  The 
description of Downtown Manhattan helps point to which conclusions might 
generalize, and which probably do not.  (Like Downtown Manhattan, inner 
Melbourne has dense, quickly moving pedestrian crowds, but the Australian safety 
net differs greatly from the US, and so some conclusions may not apply to 
Melbourne).   
Section 2 is a literature review. Section 3 provides a brief theory of the 
panhandling market.   Section 4 is a description of downtown Manhattan, and how it 
was changing in the period we observed.  Sections 5 and 6 describe how we 
gathered the data we use in this paper, and section 7 gives our main empirical 
results.  Section 8 concludes. 
 Throughout this paper, we have replaced the names of the panhandlers with 
pseudonyms.  Where possible, we have also changed the names of streets.  
Downtown Manhattan, however, includes places like Ground Zero, Wall Street, and 
Zuccotti Park that are iconic locations, and we have not tried to disguise them. 
2. Literature Review 
The literature that examines panhandling as a business or tries to 
understand who benefits from panhandling is sparse.  We have found nothing, for 
instance, that either supports or contradicts Lord Mayor Doyle’s claim that giving 
incentivizes more homelessness and panhandling, or addresses it any other way.  In 
EconLit, most citations to “panhandling,” “panhandlers,” “beggars,” and “begging” 
use these terms metaphorically—referring, for instance, to beggar-thy-neighbor 
policies in international trade. The next largest group of papers, primarily outside 
economics journals, examine either the constitutionality of or political support for 
vagrancy ordinances and similar measures designed to reduce panhandling (both 
positively--what cities have them, e.g., Smith 2005--and normatively--e.g., Ellickson 
1996), but they do not address how these measures affect panhandlers or potential 
donors. 
 Several papers do, however, study panhandling directly.  Fogel (1994) 
contains an illuminating discussion of the relationship between caloric 
requirements and begging in the Ancien Régime France.  Goldstein (1993) and 
O’Flaherty (1996) report on surveys of panhandlers, but these surveys were small, 
did not have rigorous sampling designs, did not probe deeply into what panhandlers 
did, and did not learn anything about donors.  They are now also out-of-date.   
 Outside the US, sociologists and medical researchers have made several 
valiant estimates of income from panhandling: Adriaenssens and Hendrickx (2011) 
in Brussels, Bose and Hwang (2002) in Toronto, Butovskaya et al (2004) on trains in 
Moscow, Jiang and Wu as reported in Lu (1999) in Shanghai, and Murdoch (1994) in 
London.   In most of these studies, mean panhandling income per hour is around the 
minimum wage, maybe a little bit higher. Dordick (1997) includes a great deal of 
information about panhandling in an ethnographic study of New York street people.  
Lankenau (1999a, 1999b) examines how panhandlers try to elicit donations.  
Duneier (1999) provides an illuminating sociocultural account of poor, 
predominantly black men, who eke out a living as second hand book vendors and as 
panhandlers on the sidewalks of Greenwich Village. And Snow and Anderson (1993, 
2003) situate panhandling as one of the many forms of “shadow work” that street 
people engage in to make money.  
 Lee and Farrell (2003) is one of the few papers that use survey data.  They 
use national samples of homeless people to find the extent of panhandling activity in 
this population (a distinct minority), and a national sample of domiciled people to 
find the extent of experience with panhandling, the correlates of giving, and the 
correlates of attitudes toward homelessness.  The proportion of homeless people 
who panhandled was small, but a majority of domiciled people said they gave to 
panhandlers at least occasionally.  Almost a quarter said they gave regularly.  Few 
people changed activities in order to avoid panhandling. 
  
3. Models of Panhandling, Downtown Style 
 Before we can present empirical results, we need a model for understanding 
the data.  We proceed with a series of increasingly complicated and increasingly 
realistic models. 
We think of Downtown Manhattan as a collection of locations (block-fronts), 
each of which usually fits no more than one panhandler.  Each location l has a rate of 
return gl at which a panhandler in that location would receive donations per unit 
time. We abstract for now from effort decisions by panhandlers, and from any 
differences in their ability to get donations at a particular location—for instance, 
because they are well known there.  The rate of donations, however, may vary with 
time and weather. 
 Occasionally a pair of panhandlers will work together, and occasionally two 
panhandlers, operating independently, will occupy different parts of the same block 
front.  We will consider two different methods for treating these rare occurrences, 
and show later that our major results are robust to the choice of method. 
 We will begin from the simplest case and add complexity. 
3.1 Locations as Islands 
 In the simplest case, we think of each location as a separate island. On each 
island, panhandling activity is a semi-Markov process. 
 The rate at which entry occurs is a weakly increasing isoelastic function of 
the rate of return: 
,    ≥ 0. 
When the location is occupied, the rate at which exit occurs is also a function of the 
rate of return: 
. 
 Let () denote the steady-state expected population of location l.  In the 
steady state 
() =  ,    
and so 
() =  , 
where  = / and  =  + .  Taking logs: 
(1) ln () = ln  +  ln  . 
 
Since () is the expected number of panhandlers at location l in the steady state, a 
Poisson regression would recover  if we knew gl (or some multiple) at every 
location. 
 We call  the “supply elasticity” in an obvious analogy to standard labor 
economics: m is like the elasticity at the extensive margin and x is like the elasticity 
at the intensive margin.  The elasticity at the extensive margin depends on the 
heterogeneity of reservation wages among potential panhandlers, and the elasticity 
at the intensive margin depends on the rate at which panhandlers get tired and the 
rate at which better opportunities appear (in other words, how the instantaneous 
reservation wage changes).  Note that we have not required that  > 0: the 
individual supply curves may be backward bending.  Some of the panhandlers we 
have talked with have described themselves as target earners, and so it might be the 
case that  < 0. 
 Heterogeneity in locations, on the other hand, is represented by the variance 
in gl.  In the steady state, the more lucrative locations are more likely to be occupied, 
and the panhandlers with lower reservation wages are more likely to be working, 
but there are no hard-and-fast cutoffs as there are in a standard market.  Pairings 
between locations and panhandlers that would not occur in a market and that would 
not be sanctioned by an omniscient Paretian planner sometimes occur, and pairings 
that a market or an omniscient planner would produce sometimes do not occur.  In 
this model a demand shock appears as an increase (or decrease) in the rate of 
return in some or all locations.  A positive demand shock increases panhandling at 
the affected locations as long as  > 0. 
 An alternative formulation is to assume that no more than one panhandler 
can occupy a location at the same time (or to define locations as so small that only 
one person can occupy them, or to consider a pair of panhandlers working together 
as a single entity).  Then in the steady state the average rate at which panhandlers 
enter is  
1 − () . 
The rate of exit is the same as in the previous case.  Then in the steady state 
() =  1 − () ,    
and so 
()1 − () =  . 
 Taking logs: 
(2) 
                ln ()1 − () = ln  +  ln . 
Then a logit regression rather than a Poisson regression can recover the supply 
elasticity.  Accordingly, we will use both Poisson and logit regressions. 
 Our model, then, is one of panhandlers who are poorly informed (although 
not completely uninformed), and poorly organized.  They do not immediately go to 
the best available location, they do not trade or bargain among themselves actively 
or even communicate much, and they do not follow orders designed to maximize 
gross revenue.  These assumptions about panhandlers are based on several 
conclusions we have reached through ethnographic research. 
 First, panhandlers, even experienced ones (those who have been working at 
the same location for an extended period of time, perhaps years), do not know a lot 
about alternative locations. None could articulate why they were working in their 
current location rather than somewhere else, although some had had experience in 
other spots. For instance, Freddy had panhandled in several locations before he 
started in the place where we saw him most, and he told us, “This spot just seems to 
work.”5 .  Donations are a random variable with a large variance, and so learning 
about their central tendencies is likely to be very slow.  We were unable to speak 
with the panhandlers who were not experienced, though presumably their 
information is even less adequate. 
 Second, we witnessed nothing like a monopolist or a competitive market.  If 
someone controlled the rights to panhandle downtown and extorted tribute from 
panhandlers for their use of this space, no one told us about it.  We also saw no 
bargaining over locations of any kind.  We observed few ties between panhandlers. 
 Panhandling locations seem to be allocated among panhandlers the way 
seats on a half-empty bus are allocated: first come first served, no monetary 
                                                        
5 While Freddie did not articulate what was good about his location, he had developed a relationship 
with a nearby pizza store that allowed him to access their restroom, which was important to him 
because he needed a handicapped-accessible facility. 
 
transactions, and better seats more likely to be occupied.  That is how the model is 
developed. 
 What about the question of whether a location can accommodate more than 
one panhandler?  That is, should we use the Poisson or the logit specification? 
 There does seem to be a norm against one panhandler displacing another.  
For instance, we met Theo at a corner that did not seem to have a lot of foot traffic 
and he told us that he was getting donations, but at a slow clip.  He said he usually 
worked on the other side of the street, but when he arrived today at noon, later than 
usual, another panhandler was already there. Citing first-come-first-serve, he moved 
to his present location.  He was clearly more skilled and aggressive than the 
panhandler who had arrived first—that panhandler was asleep and his cup was 
empty.  But Theo was not trying to displace him. 
 Part of the reason for this norm may be practical: an arriving panhandler 
does not have a good way of dislodging an incumbent.  A fight between panhandlers 
is likely to draw unwelcome attention—from police, merchants, or potential donors, 
for instance-and so any victory is likely to be Pyrrhic. Fights occur, but they are rare. 
 What about paying an incumbent to leave peacefully?  We have not seen this 
occur, and the idea was foreign to almost all of the panhandlers we talked to.6  At the 
start of a session, a panhandler may not have enough cash to pay someone to leave, 
may not be willing to show that cash if he had it, and may not wish to set a 
precedent that would encourage somebody to set up shop in the disputed place 
                                                        
6 When asked what he would do if someone was in his spot, one panhandler, Leroy, said that he 
would pay them $2.00 to leave.  However, this is what he said he would do.  We have no evidence that 
he in fact did this. Also, he was not referring to a panhandler, but to someone sleeping in his spot.  
regularly and collect from him rather than regular donors.  We have never seen one 
passenger pay another to give up a seat on a bus or train either. 
 But this norm does not always prevent one panhandler from working close to 
another (we have witnessed a fight over this issue—the only fight we saw).  Of 
course, being very close to another panhandler may reduce the rate of return that a 
panhandler realizes (see section 4.3): donors may be loath to donate to panhandlers 
or may have only a small amount of expendable currency.   
 Thus probably the most general way to resolve the question of two-
panhandlers-on-the-same-block-front is to propose that each receives only a 
fraction f of what he would receive if he were alone.  We don’t know what f is, but 
the Poisson and logit specifications are polar cases of the values that f could take.  If 
f=0, then the rate of return to a second entering panhandler is zero. So panhandlers 
will never arrive at occupied locations and the logit specification holds precisely.  If 
f=1, an already-occupied location is just like an unoccupied location as far as new 
arrivals are concerned, and the Poisson specification holds precisely.  The two 




3.2 Moving between Locations 
 Panhandlers sometimes move between locations, contrary to the isolation 
assumptions of section 3.1.  (Passengers move between seats on a half-empty bus, 
too.)  Such movement may cause greater concentration of panhandlers in the better 
locations. 
 Consider the Poisson version of the model.  Conditional on location i being 
occupied, let !"#  be the rate at which movement from location i to location j occurs.  
We assume that !"#  is decreasing in the rate of return at the origin and increasing in 
the rate of return at the destination: panhandlers are more likely to leave worse 
spots and go to better ones.  Specifically 
!"# = τ"%#&. 
This is essentially a simple gravity equation. Complete isolation is a special case 
with ' = 0. 
 In the steady state, the average rate of outflow from location i is  
(() = )" + * '"%#&#+" ,. 
The rate of inflow to location i is  
" + ∑ '(.)#%"&#+" . 
Hence in the steady state 
(() = " + ∑ '(.)#%"&#+"" + ∑ '"%#&#+"  
With some difficulty, this system of equations can be solved.  
 Specifically, let  
/" = "" + ∑ '"%#&#+"  
be the weight on the no-internal-movement steady state.  Note that if ' = 0, /" = 1 
and if ' goes to infinity, /" goes to zero.  If x<y  (the elasticity of external leaving is 
less than the elasticity of internal leaving), than /" is greater for larger values of ". 
 
 Also, let  
0#" = #&∑ 1&1+" . 
Then:  
(() = /"" + (1 − /")"2 * 0#"#2#+" . 
(A similar formula applies for the logit case.) 
 The intuition is that if ' is very small, the steady state probability (() will be 
almost proportional to " , as before, where  =  +  is the “external” elasticity of 
supply. When there is little movement between locations, such movement doesn’t 
matter much.  If ' is very large, on the other hand, then approximately only internal 
movements matter in the steady state, and (() will be almost proportional to "2 , as 
before, where 3 = 4 + 5 is the “internal” elasticity of supply.  For intermediate 
values of ', (() is a weighted average of these two values.  Thus if 3 >  (the 
internal elasticity of supply is greater than the external), then increasing ', the rate 
of internal movement, makes the concentration of panhandlers in the more lucrative 
locations greater.  If 3 < , the opposite occurs.  We have no strong feelings about 
whether the internal elasticity is greater than the external, but an intuition suggests 
that it is: moving from one block to another is easier than taking up or leaving 
panhandling.  Thus we will write the sequel under the assumption that 3 > , and 
our empirical work in section 6 suggests that it is (but we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that it is not). 
 Notice that if 3 > , the elasticity of panhandling with respect to the rate of 
return will be greater in the time series than in the cross-section.  This differs from 
the isolation case in section 4.1 where the time series and cross-section elasticities 
were the same.  Movement between locations also means that location populations 
will no longer be independent 
 
3.3 External Effects 
 The final extension is to allow the presence of panhandling at one location to 
affect the rate of return to panhandling at other locations.  For instance, if donors 
have only a limited amount of spare change and most pedestrians walk from east to 
west on a particular street at a particular time, the presence of a panhandler at an 
eastern location may reduce the rate of return at a western location.  Alternatively, 
simple presence of a large number of panhandlers may suggest to some potential 
donors that “everybody is panhandling,” not just the neediest, and lead them to 
conclude that the average panhandler is less deserving. (A fully worked out version 
of this model can be found in Dordick and O’Flaherty 2014).  Thus, for instance, 
some panhandlers in 2013 told us that Occupy Wall Street (OWS) had hurt their 
business because Wall Streeters did not think that OWS panhandlers were well-
deserving, and confused regular panhandlers with the OWS variant.  One 
panhandler said, “OWS people take money away from me.”  He told us that they 
panhandle to get money from the folks that they hate, and referred to them as “a 
bunch of trust fund babies.”  So external effects can be either positional or 
informational. 
 To begin, assume no moves between locations—the model of section 3.1.  
Consider two locations, 1 and 2. Assume that when a panhandler is working at 
location 1 the rate of return at location 2 falls.  Then location 2 will be less likely to 
be occupied when location 1 is occupied, holding all other conditions constant.  This 
is testable, if we assume no movement between locations. 
 When moves between locations are possible, this conclusion needs to be 
modified because such moves may not be distinguishable from externalities.  
Suppose 6 > 7.  Then even without a negative externality location 2 will be less 
likely to be occupied when location 1 occupied, because a panhandler at location 2 is 
likely to move to location 1, and leave location 2 empty.  An externality from 
location 1 to location 2 is qualitatively observationally equivalent to a movement 
from 2 to 1, assuming that 1 is the more lucrative location.  On the other hand, if 
6 < 7, a finding that location 2 is less likely to be occupied when location 1 is 
occupied is strong evidence for an externality in the hypothesized direction. 
 
3.4 Information and Panhandling Skill 
 In the preceding sections we assumed that all panhandlers looked the same 
to all potential donors; active panhandlers differed only in the location they were 
using.  But panhandlers also differ in other relevant ways, especially in the 
impression that they make on potential donors. 
 The impression is important because many potential donors, even those who 
are philanthropically inclined, believe that most panhandlers are fraudulent in one 
way or another.  Almost all casual conversations we have had with affluent New 
Yorkers about panhandling have begun with either a declaration that most 
panhandlers are scams, or a question about whether we think they are scams.  To 
make more money than average, a panhandler has to persuade some potential 
donors that he is more deserving than the average panhandler.   
 We have not observed many clever strategies for doing so.  One panhandler 
we saw in 2014 used humorous signs. But he was not around in 2015, and we do not 
know how successful he was.  No one imitated him.  Several panhandlers are 
wheelchair-bound, but anyone can rent a wheelchair and sit in it.  These 
panhandlers appear to be more successful than average, but their success is 
probably not solely due to their wheelchairs.   
 Persistence is the main way that a panhandler can set himself or herself apart 
from peers.  Persistent panhandlers can develop a regular “customer base”—a 
group of donors who recognize them and give regularly.  Persistence is a signal that 
a panhandler has a low reservation wage—otherwise he would not be on the street 
that often—and good work habits—someone who abused drugs or alcohol would 
probably not be able to maintain regular hours.  Seeing someone over and over 
again also makes him appear to be more of a friend, or at least a human, and less of a 
symbol.  Not all panhandlers are persistent, and not all have regular customers, but 
a few do, and they stand out and probably account for a significant fraction of the 
money that panhandlers collect. 
 Two external conditions must be met for a panhandler to develop a regular 
customer base.  First, he needs a flow of the same people on the same block for 
months or years.  Thus a regular customer base consists of workers or residents, not 
tourists. 
 Second, the location where he meets his base must be secure, both from 
other panhandlers and from construction crews.  If the location disappears or is 
taken over by another panhandler, the customer base is lost too—he can’t email or 
text them with the new location.  For panhandlers, avoiding construction crews 
downtown is probably purely a matter of luck.  Avoiding interloping panhandlers is 
probably simpler: if there is no shortage of fine locations, no interloper has a large 
incentive to displace an incumbent.  Established panhandlers may also have made 
friends with security people and maintenance people from abutting properties, and 
so have allies in deterring interlopers.7 
 
4. Downtown Manhattan 
4.1 The Basic Setting 
 Our research has concentrated on Manhattan south of Duane Street, which 
we call “Downtown Manhattan.” Within this area of under a square mile8, we 
concentrate on the corridor within two or three blocks of Broadway, because there 
                                                        
7 Eli successfully used his relationships with the police to have panhandlers either removed from his 
spot or from nearby on his block front.  In fact, he did have the police remove a woman panhandling 
close to the subway entrance near Church Street with her young son and another wheelchair bound 
panhandler who situated himself closer to the PATH station. 
 
8 New York City Community District 1 has an area of 1.49 square miles, according to the Department 
of City Planning 2016.  The community district includes the area we study, plus Tribeca, Governor’s 
Island, Liberty Island, and Ellis Island. The islands alone have an area of about 0.3 square miles. 
are few panhandlers outside this corridor.  Our data for non-panhandling activity, 
however, cover New York City Community District 1, a slightly larger area. 
 Downtown Manhattan is rich, bustling, and crowded. In the third quarter of 
2014, about 266,000 people worked in this area, with an average private sector 
salary of $148,000 (Downtown Alliance 2015).  Wall Street and New York Federal 
Reserve Bank are located in Downtown Manhattan, but many people work in non-
financial jobs too.  New York City Hall and many municipal offices are found here, as 
well as a large number of state employees.  There is also a growing representation of 
media companies, most notably Conde Nast and Time (Downtown Alliance 2016).  
Many people also work in low-paying service and retail jobs in Downtown 
Manhattan.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
 In addition, 9.6 million tourists visited in the third quarter of 2014, and 
61,000 residents lived in the area (with an average household income of $204,000) 
(Downtown Alliance 2015).  Few people travel by car, where they would be hard for 
panhandlers to reach.  (Parking spots in nearby neighborhoods cost up to $1 million 
(Green, 2015).  On an average day, about 430,000 people entered Downtown 
Manhattan by public transit, excluding buses.  The sidewalks are jammed: a 2006 
Department of City Planning report (NYC Department of City Planning 2006) found 
many block fronts where over 2,000 people passed in an hour—and this was early 
in Downtown’s recovery from 9/11.  The GDP of Downtown Manhattan is probably 
greater than that of Latvia or Wyoming. Downtown seems like a good place to 
panhandle. 
4.2 How it Changed 
 Between summer 2014 and summer 2015, prospects for panhandling seem 
to have improved notably.  The tallest building in the Western Hemisphere, One 
World Trade Center, opened in November 2014, and its popular observation deck 
opened in May 2015.   The September 11 Museum had opened right before the 
summer started in 2014, but had substantially more visitors in 2015 than 2014.9  
The new Fulton Transportation Center opened partially in winter 2014, making 
access to Downtown Manhattan easier for many people in New York City (but also 
offering pedestrians more opportunities to travel underground).   
 Table 1 pulls together information about changes in various kinds of 
measured activity in Downtown Manhattan between 2014 and 2015.  The 
outstanding feature in this table is the surge in tourism, and tourism-related 
activity—a growth of almost 30 percent in the number of tourists visiting the 
neighborhood.  Employment and resident population grew too, but relatively slowly.  
The spending power metric combines both tourists and more permanent people, 
and rose almost 12 percent.   
 When we look at disaggregated data for different parts of Downtown, the 
surge in tourism is apparent.  We have two sources of information on pedestrian 
activity: New York City Department of Transportation (DoT) pedestrian counts, and 
Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) swipe data. Neither is perfect or complete. 
 The DoT counts cover only a few block fronts.  Since 2007, the DoT has been 
counting pedestrians twice a year, in May and in September, at 114 locations in New 
                                                        
9 The 2014 annual report said that there had been 1.8 million visitors (September 11 Museum 2014) 
and the 2015 annual report said that there had been over 4 million cumulative visitors (September 
11 Museum 2015). 
York City.  Seven of these are in Downtown Manhattan.  The DoT counts pedestrians 
on both sides of the street.  In each month, the counts take place on a weekday (not 
Monday or Friday) between 7 am and 9 am and between 4 pm and 7 pm, and on a 
Saturday between noon and 2 pm.  We concentrate on the weekday afternoon 
counts. 
 Table 2 shows these counts for the seven downtown “streetlines.”10  For most 
of the streetlines no clear comparison between 2014 and 2015 is obvious because 
the changes are small or are not consistent in direction between months.  The 
exception is Trinity Place between Rector and Thames, which witnessed a large 
increase in pedestrian traffic.  This is close to Ground Zero, a major tourist area. 
 The other disaggregated source is Metrocard swipe data for each of the 14 
subway stations in Downtown Manhattan.  We have weekly swipe data by type of 
Metrocards from 2014 and 2015.  We pay special attention to swipes of 30-day 
unlimited Metrocards.  These cards are cheaper than pay-per-ride cards for more 
than 43 trips a month.  So it is mainly workers who use these cards. 
 Table 3 presents data on the total number of swipes and the number of 30-
day swipes for the weeks between Fourth of July and Labor Day for each of 10 
stations.  It is impossible to match stations with tourist activity tightly because many 
stations serve both tourists and non-tourists, and because several stations cover 
many blocks underground.  Nevertheless, we divide the stations into those that are 
close to major tourist destinations (Ground Zero, the Bull, and the New York Stock 
Exchange), and those that are not.  In the aggregate, swipes increase more in the 
                                                        
10 “Streetlines” are lines that cover sidewalks on both sides of a street. 
stations closer to the tourist attractions, and swipes by full fare cards increase more 
than swipes by 30-day cards.  (Some of the large changes, of course, may be due to 
construction activity, not to changes in activity above ground.  However, subway 
construction that changed the number of swipes would affect pedestrian patterns 
above ground, which is what we ultimately care about.)  
 5. Methods for Ethnographic Research  
In the summer of 2012 we began to systematically observe panhandlers in 
Downtown Manhattan.  Our initial observations were unobtrusive.  In the early 
stages when we encountered panhandlers we logged our observations into field 
notes and Google Maps.  These notes allowed us to write detailed descriptions of 
panhandlers, the locations, and some rough estimates of donor activity.  The Maps 
gave us snapshots of the overall landscape.  We did not take photographs of 
panhandlers or locations as we felt such data may jeopardize confidentiality should 
they fall into the wrong hands.   
These initial observations provided us with a pool of potential panhandlers whom 
we could speak with over a period of time.  During the summers of 2012, 2013, 2014 and 
2015 we engaged in repeated conversational interviews with a number of panhandlers. 
These conversations were often brief (we encountered panhandlers as they were working 
and didn’t want to reduce their income).  Engaging panhandlers while they were working 
gave us the opportunity to observe not only their strategies, but more importantly, observe 
how often and how much donors would drop into their cups.  As with the initial 
observations, the data were systematically logged into detailed field notes.  
 
 
 6.  Methods for Quantitative Research 
During the summers of 2013, 2014, and 2015, we, and many research 
assistants conducted a large number of “walks” in Downtown Manhattan. In 2013, 
we laid out four routes, each of which a person could walk in 20-40 minutes.   We 
began with a “pedestrian level of service study” that the New York City Department 
of City Planning (DCP) had published for downtown in 2006 (New York Department 
of City Planning, 2006).   As part of that study, they measured pedestrian flows at 62 
locations at three times of the day (morning rush hour, midday, and evening rush 
hour).  The unit of observation is a “block-front”: a sidewalk from one corner to the 
next on one side of the street.  Major physical changes had not yet occurred 
downtown when this study was done.  The 62 block-fronts were not randomly 
selected, but the DCP had some preference for subway entrances.  They included 
only 12 block-fronts on Broadway, although there are 28 block-fronts on Broadway 
below Chambers Street, and all of them are crowded. 
We divided the 62 DCP block-fronts into three classes based on midday 
flows: heavy traffic—over 2,000 pedestrians an hour; moderate traffic—between 
1,100 and 1,999 pedestrians an hour; and light traffic—under 1,100 pedestrians an 
hour.  There were 19 heavy traffic block-fronts, 30 moderate, and 13 light.  We used 
the 49 heavy and moderate traffic block-fronts for our walks.  To these we added the 
remaining 16 block fronts on Broadway below Chambers; these are concentrated 
between Fulton and Wall Streets.  In the DCP data set, all 12 Broadway block-fronts 
had pedestrian flows over 2,000 an hour, and casual observation suggests no 
substantial diminution of pedestrian traffic outside the DCP data set.  We call these 
the added block-fronts.  Broadway sidewalks are usually wide, and shade is 
reasonably abundant.  Finally, we added 6 block-fronts outside these sets where we 
had seen panhandlers sometime during the summer of 2013; we call these the 
established block-fronts.      
  In all, we had 71 block fronts.  We divided these into four routes based on a 
rough idea of what would be easy to walk.  We called these routes Eastern 
Broadway, Western Broadway, Northwest, and Crossover (because it was the only 
route that crossed Broadway).  They were designed in 2013 to encompass virtually 
all panhandling activity downtown.  In 2015, two extremely savvy research 
assistants searched the rest of downtown looking for panhandling activity that was 
not on the routes, and did not find any. 
 Figure 1 is a map of the four routes. 
 Because of the major change in tourism between 2014 and 2015, we divided 
the block-fronts in our walks into three sets, which we called “zones.”  The “tourist 
zone” consisted of the block fronts with the greatest tourist activity: the block-fronts 
adjacent to Ground Zero (including block-fronts perpendicular to the Ground Zero 
boundary), the block-fronts immediately adjacent to the bull at the foot of 
Broadway, and block-fronts adjacent to Federal Hall and the New York Stock 
Exchange.  The second zone we called “Broadway”: all the block fronts on Broadway 
except those adjacent to the bull. This zone is dominated by employment.  The third 
zone is everything else.  Figure 2 is a map of these zones. 
 7. Empirical Results 
 7.1 How Many Panhandlers Are There at a Point in Time? 
 Our first results are about the number of panhandlers.  We can record the 
prevalence of panhandling, not the incidence, because we did not attempt to identify 
individual panhandlers and trace their activities over time.  On average, about 8-10 
panhandlers were working in Downtown Manhattan.  This is an average over the 
times we surveyed.  Table 4 shows this estimate in detail. 
 The outstanding implication of this table is that very few people panhandle at 
one time.  Recall that Downtown Manhattan has the GDP of Latvia or Wyoming, 
concentrated in about a square mile; it is full of tourists and rich people who are 
walking.  Panhandling is not a widespread occupation, and only slightly more than a 
tenth of these highly-selected block fronts have panhandlers on them.  In particular, 
this result suggests that the point-in-time count for New York City panhandlers is 
almost surely less than a thousand.  By contrast, in summer 2015, approximately 
60,000 people were in city homeless shelters (New York City Department of 
Homeless Services 2016a) and the January 2015 street count had been 3200 (New 
York City Department of Homeless Services, 2016b). 
 Notice that this estimate of 8-10 panhandlers is for the average time we 
observed.  The walks tended to be concentrated in the heavier times for 
panhandling.  Figure 3 illustrates. On the figure we show fixed effects for the hours 
of the day from a Poisson regression for the presence of panhandlers (with weather 
variables and block fixed effects). We also show histograms for the starting times of 
the walks.  All three graphs peak in the late afternoon.  Thus most of the time there 
are fewer than 8-10 panhandlers active in Downtown. 
 7.2 How Long Do Panhandlers Work? 
 Although we did not identify individual panhandlers on the walks, several 
kinds of indirect information suggest that the average panhandling spell is short, 
probably only a few hours, and so the number of people who panhandle in a day or a 
week is likely a substantial multiple of 8-10. 
 We derive this rough estimate of the length of panhandling spells in two 
different ways.  First, on several occasions we walked the same route twice in a few 
hours.  In each pair of observations, we can find out how many block-fronts were 
occupied during the first walk but unoccupied during the second, and so we can 
estimate, very roughly, the hazard of a particular panhandling spell ending.  We 
observed 13 panhandlers on the first of these pairs of walks, and 7 on those block-
fronts in the second of these walks.  So 46 percent of spells ended between walks.  
The average time between the starts of the two walks in a pair was 174 minutes, and 
so the half-life of a panhandling spell was about 3 hours. 
 Second, we have data about all calls and texts sent to 311, the New York City 
non-emergency hotline, about panhandling in Community District 1.  There are very 
few such calls—only 48 calls over three years.  We know when the call or text was 
made, when the police responded, and what they found when they responded.  In 
only 11 of the calls did the police find the situation that the callers had complained 
about, but responses often took a long time, since these were not priority calls.   
 To estimate turnover, we regressed the probability that the police would find 
the panhandler on the length of time it took to respond.  We used a logit regression.  
The results indicated that if the police responded immediately, the probability was 
considerably less than one that they would have found the condition (this was an 
extrapolation because the quickest response took five minutes).  If we assume that 
this shortfall for immediate response is entirely explained by erroneous calls, then 
we can calculate the implied half-life of panhandling spells. The implied half-life is 
178 minutes, very similar to the implied half-life we found with repeated walks. 
 This similarity is almost certainly pure coincidence, since the samples are 
small and different, and we have imposed stringent assumptions on functional form.  
Since these are estimates of panhandling spells in the same location, they 
underestimate the length of panhandling spells simpliciter because a panhandler 
may try several locations in a spell. Since they require only some panhandler to be 
present later, not the one who was there earlier, they overestimate the length of 
panhandling spells in the same location. 
 A three-hour half-life implies an average spell of about 4.3 hours, if exit 
hazard rates are constant.  Such a length is congruent with what panhandlers 
reported in conversations with us. 
 
 7.3 How Did the Number of Panhandlers Change Between 2014 and 2015? 
 Table 4 shows that the number of panhandlers did not increase between 
2014 and 2015 in the raw data, despite the boom in Downtown Manhattan.  This is 
contrary to our expectations. The apparent decline is not statistically significant, but 
intuition suggests that the boom should have caused a statistically significant 
increase in panhandling. 
 The question about whether panhandling increased is important because it 
can tell us about supply elasticity.  If supply were highly elastic, general increases in 
generosity would be met by large increases in the number of panhandlers at any 
time, which might lead to fights over locations or tribute being paid to someone who 
controlled locations, or to reduced willingness of potential donors to give.  Lord 
Mayor Doyle was effectively arguing that supply was elastic when he said that Prime 
Minister Turnbull erred by giving to Peter.  But if supply were inelastic, the amount 
of panhandling would be relatively impervious to exhortations to donors and to 
small restrictions on allowable space. 
 Table 4, of course, is a crude estimate of the change in panhandling between 
the years because we did not sample the exact same-block fronts or at the exact 
same times or under the exact same weather conditions in the two years.  In 
particular, figure 3 suggests that 2014 walks were concentrated earlier in the 
afternoon, a somewhat lighter period, than 2015 walks.  Thus we will control for 
these differences to develop a more refined estimate of the average percentage 
change in panhandling between 2014 and 2015. 
 Specifically, we fit the following equation: 
 
(1) 8(ln 9:;%) = / + 0<;% + =: + >% + :;% 
where 9:;% is the number of panhandlers on block front b at time s in year t, <;% is a 
vector of time-varying conditions at time s in year y (day of the week, hour of the 
day, week, rain, temperature and temperature squared), =: is a block-front fixed 
effect, and >% is a year fixed effect (since we take 2014 as the omitted category, this 
is essentially a dummy for 2015). The variable of interest is >%: the average 
regression-corrected percentage change in panhandling between 2014 and 2015.  
Dividing this by an estimate of the percent increase in the rate of return to 
panhandling would give a rough estimate of the labor supply elasticity.  Recall from 
the theory section that with inter-location movement the average time series 
elasticity is likely to be less than the cross-section elasticity, but for most policy 
purposes, the time-series elasticity is more relevant. 
 Table 5 presents the results of estimating the equation. We cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the amount of panhandling did not change between 2014 and 2015.  
(Table A-1 in the appendix shows comparable results with the logistic specification 
instead of the Poisson.)  The point estimate with hour fixed effects (our preferred 
estimate) is slightly positive, but not close to being significant, and the sign changes 
if hour fixed effects are removed.  The first impression from table 4 is essentially 
correct. 
 The obvious explanation for the constancy of panhandling is that the overall 
supply elasticity is small at both the extensive and intensive margins.  However, 
several possible alternative explanations for this result suggest themselves.  
 The first possible alternative explanation is that the labor supply elasticity is 
zero or negative because the supply elasticity is great at intensive margin, and also 
large and negative at the intensive margin.  Recall that some panhandlers described 
themselves as target earners.  Even if the elasticity at the extensive margin is 
positive, the overall elasticity could be negative or zero if enough incumbent 
panhandlers are target earners.  We call this the target earner hypothesis.  
 One implication of the target earner hypothesis is that panhandling should 
decrease the most on block fronts that experienced the greatest increase in rate of 
return.  This is testable and we will test it in the next section.  We would expect to 
see the greatest decreases in panhandling in the tourist zone. Another implication is 
that the number of different people panhandling should increase.  We cannot test 
this because we did not use facial recognition software and attempt to identify 
panhandlers uniquely.  Our impression is that the number of different people 
panhandling did increase between 2014 and 2015, and this is consistent with 
greater entropy in the location of panhandlers (which we show in section 7.5 
below), but most impressions like this are not to be trusted. 
 The second possible alternative explanation is that on average panhandling 
became less lucrative between 2014 and 2015, not more lucrative.  Beyond a certain 
throughput, additional pedestrians may hinder panhandling, not help it, because 
pedestrians are not able to slow down and pull money out of their pockets.  If the 
increase in pedestrian flow is due to tourists, moreover, and tourists give less than 
workers and residents, the harm to panhandling will be greater.  Panhandlers with a 
regular customer base are likely to be hit hardest: if their customers change routes 
to avoid the tourist influx they are lost entirely, and if they stay on the old route the 
congestion will make it harder for them to give.  We call this the congestion 
hypothesis. 
 The testable implication of this story is block fronts that started with high 
initial pedestrian flow would be most likely to lose panhandlers, especially if they 
had large influxes of tourists.  This would predict that the greatest decreases in 
panhandling would be along Broadway. The story also implies more new faces 
among panhandlers, because the losses would be greatest for the experienced. 
 Another explanation is that the demand shock was offset by a supply shock: 
the prospects outside of panhandling for poor people improved and they turned to 
other pursuits.  We cannot test this explanation with our data, but we find it 
implausible.  Single adult shelter population rose 14.2 percent from July 2014 to July 
2015 (NYC DHS 2016).  The closest alternative to panhandling on the streets is 
panhandling on the subways (which is illegal); there was a massive increase in 
subway panhandling arrests in 2014 (Taylor 2014) and Police Commissioner 
Bratton kept pressure up in the subways in 2015, since reducing minor subway 
crime was a Bratton signature strategy.  The redemption price of recycled cans was 
unchanged. If there was a supply shock, it is more likely that it was positive (more 
panhandlers on the street) than negative. 
 A final possible alternative explanation is that panhandling could not expand 
because there was no room; it was sharply constrained by the availability of good 
locations.  We will examine this possibility below in section 7.5 below. 
 7.4 Zone Results 
 Our next step is to disaggregate the change in panhandling by zone.  The 
different explanations have different implications for how the zones should have 
changed, and so we can learn more about what happened by looking at zones. 
 The simple way of doing this is to disaggregate block fronts by zone, and to 
compare average numbers of panhandlers observed in 2014 and 2015.  This is 
essentially table 4, but with block fronts sorted by zone rather than by walk (and 
missing observations treated slightly differently).  The results are in table 6.   
Average panhandlers per block front increased in the tourist zone and the other 
areas, but decreased substantially on Broadway.   
 Of course, because the 2015 walks differed from the 2014 in many ways 
(especially time of day), we need to correct for differences.  To do this, we remove 
the dummy variable for 2015 from equation (1), and interact this dummy variable 
with dummy variables for each of the three zones.  We also drop the block-front 
fixed effects. So the coefficient on the tourist zone dummy interacted with the 2015 
dummy, for instance, gives the average percentage change in panhandling in the 
tourist zone between 2014 and 2015.  Table 7 presents the key results.  (Table A-2 
in the appendix shows comparable results with the logistic specification instead of 
the Poisson.) 
 Table 7 shows that the increase in tourism is associated with a large and 
statistically significant increase in panhandling in the tourist zone (the logit 
specification shows an increase, but not statistically significant).  We can reject the 
target earner hypothesis.  The congestion hypothesis receives minimal support, as 
the Broadway coefficient is slightly negative, but insignificant (and the raw data 
show a large decrease on Broadway).   
 The obvious story is that the rise in tourism attracted more panhandlers, 
possibly at the expense of Broadway (this is an alternative to the congestion 
hypothesis to explain the possible decline in Broadway panhandling).  The supply 
elasticity within Downtown is positive.  Since annual visitors increased by about 30 
percent and panhandling within the tourist zone increased by about 70 percent, the 
elasticity may be greater than one.  But since overall panhandling probably did not 
increase Downtown, most of the gain in tourist zone panhandling was relocation 
from Broadway, not new panhandlers.   
 7.5 Locations and Heterogeneity 
 How different are the rates of return to the locations that panhandlers might 
use downtown?  Are a lot of places pretty much the same, or are there just a few 
places that suitable for panhandling, with other locations distinctly inferior? 
 This question is important for our inquiry into why aggregate panhandling 
did not increase in response to the 2015 demand shock—perhaps the added 
locations that would have had to be occupied to accommodate an influx of 
panhandlers were so inferior to existing locations that the demand shock was not 
big enough to make them attractive to many panhandlers.  The panhandling 
response would have been constrained by the absence of suitable locations. 
 The question is also important for our broader inquiry into who benefits 
from panhandling.  If a few locations are superior to all others, then control of these 
locations could generate rent.  Panhandlers themselves might not be the ultimate 
beneficiaries of donors’ generosity, because they might have to share it with 
whoever controlled these locations, and at the very least we would expect to see 
contention and conflict.  On the other hand, if a lot of locations are pretty much the 
same, then we would expect to see little fighting, and the donations that 
panhandlers get are likely to stay with them. 
 Heterogeneity also matters for policy because many policy proposals seek to 
limit the number and type of locations where panhandling occurs.  The welfare 
implications of these policies depend in part on whether the locations prohibited 
have good substitutes, and the market implications depend on the heterogeneity of 
the remaining locations.  We explore these issues in the companion paper. 
 Notice that for all purposes, the similarity of locations matters only for 
locations that are sometimes occupied, or are on the margin of occupation.  Since 
only 8-10 locations are occupied at an average time, how good the 70th best location 
is doesn’t matter.   
 We have already seen some indirect evidence that locations are fairly 
homogenous within these bounds.  That panhandlers are peaceful and atomistic 
suggests little heterogeneity among locations—but peace and atomism could have 
other explanations, too (panhandling might just attract individuals who are pleasant 
and laid-back, for instance).  Similarly, the expansion of panhandling in the tourist 
zone suggests that in 2014 panhandling was not seriously constrained by the 
availability of decent locations.   
 In this section we try to understand how heterogeneous locations are.  This is 
hard because we are concerned with heterogeneity in the rate of return that a 
standard panhandler would realize, and we do not observe this variable.  Instead, 
we take two indirect approaches: expert evaluations, and the revealed preferences 
of panhandlers. 
7.5.1 Expert Evaluations 
 In 2016, an experienced busker examined all of the block-fronts and assessed 
how attractive they were for panhandling (and busking).  He sorted them into 
several different ordered categories, in two different ways.  The first was intuitive: 
his unstructured reaction after looking at the block-front.  The second was 
structured: he assessed the block-front on four criteria (space, circulation, 
construction and security) and gave it a score by aggregating the scores on the 
criteria. 
 The two assessments are consistent.  The correlation between the intuitive 
score (as ordered integers) and the structured summary score was 0.81.  The 
Spearman rank order correlation was also 0.81.  We also regressed the intuitive 
score on the criteria.  All of the criteria have positive and significant effects on the 
intuitive score. 
 Finally, we compared the expert assessments with results of the walks.  First 
we ran the following Poisson regression: 
(2) 8(ln 9:?) = / + 0@? + :? 
Where the controls in @? were categorical dummies for time of day, day of week, 
year, and rain; and continuous variables for temperature and temperature squared.  
Then we added categorical variables for the expert assessments, both intuitive and 
structured.  The results are in table 8 (was table 4). 
 The first panel of table 8 shows that the intuitive assessments accurately 
predict the presence panhandlers:  significantly more panhandlers are observed in 
higher ranked locations.  However, there is very little difference between the two 
highest categories.  The second panel shows a similar effect when the total scores 
from the structured assessments: locations with higher scores have more 
panhandlers.  All of the categories with scores above 3 have significantly more 
panhandlers than categories with scores below 3.  There is a difference that is 
almost significant, however, between locations with the highest possible score, 6, 
and locations with scores in the 3-5 range.  
 Thus both the intuitive and structured evaluations appear to be reasonable 
descriptions of how attractive locations are.   
 The intuitive evaluations suggest that locations are fairly homogenous in the 
relevant range.  Table 9 shows the number of locations by intuitive evaluation.  
Table 8 shows that the “good” and “very good” categories are not much different, 
and table 9 shows that a total of 21 block-fronts were “good” or “very good.”  With 
8-10 panhandlers at an average time, it seems unlikely that all the good and very 
good block-fronts are ever occupied simultaneously.   
 Similarly, with the structured evaluations, 12 locations have the highest 
possible score of 6, and there does not appear to be much difference among the next 
48 locations with scores in the 3-5 range. Based on these measures, it does not 
appear that panhandlers have any reason to fight over locations. 
7.5.2 Revealed Preferences 
 We can also look at measures of heterogeneity based directly on panhandler 
behavior.  The basic insight from the model in section 3 is that if two locations differ 
greatly in the rate of return, it should be very rare for the less lucrative one to be 
occupied while the more lucrative one is empty.  But if rates of return are fairly 
similar, the less lucrative one will often be occupied when the more lucrative one is 
empty. 
 The first way we look at revealed preferences is simply to record the 
probability that a block-front will be occupied by at least one panhandler when it is 
observed.  For each of the 71 block-fronts we calculate this probability in each year, 
and in figure 4 we display it.  For each year, we array block-fronts from the most 
popular to the least (if panhandlers had to pay to rent a block-front, this would 
resemble a downward-sloping demand curve).  Figure 4 shows that panhandling 
was much less concentrated in 2015 than in 2014.  In 2014 only four locations were 
occupied more than 60% of the times that we surveyed them and in 2015, none 
were. In other words, even the very best locations were often unoccupied in both 
years. In 2014, popularity shows something of a cliff in the 8-14 range, but this 
range is very close to flat in 2015.  In both years, there were many block fronts (46 
in 2014 and 17 in 2015) where we never saw a panhandler, even though we chose 
these block-fronts in the belief that they were the places where panhandlers would 
most readily be found.   
 Raw probabilities of occupation, however, do not control for changes in time 
and weather.  Therefore figure 5 is the same as figure 4, but shows the block-front 
fixed effects from equation (1), also arrayed from biggest to smallest.  (Since many 
block-fronts in each year have no sightings of panhandlers, many block-fronts have 
uniformly negative fixed effects. The default in this case is a particular block on 
which no panhandlers were seen in either year, and so all the fixed effects are non-
negative.)  The pattern in figure 5 resembles that in figure 4, with no discontinuities 
in the range of 8-10 block fronts.   
 Thus all results point to moderate levels of heterogeneity, and less 
heterogeneity in 2015 than in 2014.  Locations differ, but many of them don’t differ 
that much. 
 7.6  Interdependence 
 A final question about locations is whether the presence of panhandlers at 
one location influences their presence at others.  Included in this question is 
whether panhandlers tend to move between locations, as our finding of an increase 
in panhandling in the tourist zone suggested.  We concentrate on influences 
between locations that are close to each other on the same route.  Obviously, 
influences could be more complex than this, but if there are any influences at all, 
they are likely to be present at this level.  More complex influences, and those that 
operated over a greater difference, would also be harder to find—in part, because 
we never observe two locations far from each other simultaneously, because foot 
travel takes time. 
 On each route we divide block fronts into those that are interior (they have a 
neighbor on each side) and those that are not (the first and last, which have only one 
neighbor each).  For each block front b, let nb = 1 if b is interior, zero otherwise.  If 
block front b is interior, let dbt be the number of neighboring block fronts that are 
occupied on day t; the possible values are 0, 1, and 2.  If the block front is not 
interior, let Dit be the number of neighboring block fronts occupied on day t; 
possible values are 0 and 1. 
 Then we fit equations of the following form: 
ln 9:? = / + 0@? + A8: + 34:B:? + (1 − 4:)C:? + :? 
where 8: is a vector of expert evaluations (both intuitive and structured in different 
equations) of how attractive block front b is. Our coefficients of interest are 3 and .   
 Results of this equation can be found in column 1 of table 10.  An interior 
block-front is less likely to have a panhandler on it if neighboring block-fronts have 
panhandlers on them.  This result is borderline significant when the structured 
evaluation is used, but not when the intuitive evaluation is used.  For terminal block 
fronts, effects are imprecisely estimated and not stable (possibly because there are 
few of them).  So there is some weak evidence that interdependence matters, and 
that it works in the negative direction. 
 Interdependence like this is consistent with either movement (section 3.2) or 
externalities (section 3.3). The strength of the movement effect, however, depends 
on how relatively lucrative the neighboring locations are, while the externality effect 
does not.  To try to see how much of the interdependence effect is movement, we 
add another two variables.  The variable rbt is the average of the intuitive rankings of 
location b’s two neighbors for interior b, and Rbt is the intuitive ranking of location 
b’s single neighbor, if b is not interior.  Then we estimate the equation: 
ln 9:? = / + 0@? + A8: + 34:B:? + (1 − 4:)C:? + =4:D:? + >(1 − 4:)E:? + :? 
The results are column 2 of table 10.  With the structured evaluations, more 
attractive neighbors reduces the presence of panhandlers at a block-front 
significantly.  The same is true for intuitive evaluations, but the result is not 
significant.  With structured evaluations, controlling for neighbor quality makes the 
negative sign on the presence of neighbors for the structured evaluation 
significantly negative. Thus it seems that the interdependence effect is primarily 
from movement: panhandlers leave worse locations when better locations are 
nearby (or never start working on worse locations when they can see a better one).  
This is consistent with the picture of movement between locations. 
  
  
 8.  Conclusion 
 So it seems that Prime Minister Turnbull had a more accurate model of 
panhandling than Lord Mayor Doyle, at least if Inner Melbourne is like Downtown 
Manhattan.  Turnbull’s example was unlikely to trigger a deluge of panhandlers into 
Melbourne, although if it inspired a lot of pedestrians it might move a few 
panhandlers from Flinders Street to Collins Street.  A single Australian prime 
minister is not likely to be more powerful than the tallest building in the Western 
Hemisphere.  The donation mattered to Peter, and that was about it, and it probably 
did not matter much to Peter after he ate lunch. 
 The picture of Downtown panhandlers that emerges from our study is that of 
a small group of men (and a few women) who are either highly unusual (for 
consistent panhandlers) or at an unusual point in their lives (for sporadic 
panhandlers).  They are not unusual in their poverty, but probably in their 
willingness to withstand the stigma, rejection, uncertainty, and physical hardships 
that serious panhandling entails.  No doubt some people at the margin could be 
coaxed into panhandling by higher pecuniary returns, or convinced to extend their 
sojourn into panhandling a little longer.  But the number of people at the extensive 
margin is small (at this time and place), and any extensive margin effects may be 
offset by target-earning behavior among infra-marginal panhandlers. 
 These men and women are not irrational or impervious to their 
surroundings.  They responded to the tourist influx by moving to locations that 
became more attractive and in general they are less likely to panhandle at a worse 
location when a better one is nearby.  But they are not instantaneous omniscient 
maximizers. 
 Because the number of people who want to panhandle, even at the best times 
and places, is small, space is effectively free.  Supply at zero price exceeds demand.  
Because space is free, so is courtesy, and so is abiding by norms.  There is little 
surplus that a monopolist could extract, either by controlling locations or restricting 
labor supply.  So there is no monopolist. 
 We could have estimated elasticities more precisely if we had more 
observations and better information about pedestrian flows and generosity.  That 
would have made for a better paper.  Still, we can be pretty sure that the effect of the 
boom in Downtown was small in practical terms.  Even if the elasticity of aggregate 
panhandling with respect to spending power is unity—which is unlikely—the boom 
would have added only about one panhandler at the average time we observed—
and this is in an economy the size of Latvia’s. 
 The difficulty we had in estimating this elasticity, however, illustrates 
another reason why it is probably small: the panhandling environment is very noisy.  
Variations of 10 percent or more in pedestrian flows at the same place and time of 
the week are common in the DoT data between May and September in the same 
year.  Within pedestrian flows the rate of generosity probably varies too.  And even 
if the rate of giving per 1000 pedestrians is constant, random variation in actual 
donations will be large.  Many block-fronts may go weeks without a panhandler 
sampling from them.  So while it may be the case that in the limit panhandlers will 
have enough time to adjust to a one-time shock to one of the basic parameters, the 
limit may be far away, and other shocks may intervene.  The speed of adjustment 
may be very slow. 
 The speed of academic learning about panhandling as an industry, however, 
may be faster.  This paper is a first step.  A companion paper (Dordick et al. 2017) 
explores policy implications and shows different ways in which this paper’s results 
affect optimal policy.  Another companion paper will look more deeply at how 
panhandlers view their world and each other, and adjust to both. 
 Beyond the current project, the need to learn about other environments and 
other shocks is obvious; so is the need to engage in policy experiments.  Recent 
literature (e.g., Della Vigna et al 2012, Trachtman et al 2015, and Andreoni et al 
2016) has taught us a great deal about donors and non-donors to organized 
charities; we need to learn similar things about donors to panhandlers. 
 After Prime Minister Turnbull gave Peter the fiver, he told the media and the 
Committee for Economic Development about his plans to prepare a budget bill that 
the opposition had said it could support; it was his first major economic address 
following the election and revealed important information about the management of 
Australia’s economy.  This story did not go viral.  Even though Peter is not 
traditional click-bait like kittens and Kardashians, the public found his story much 
more interesting than the prime minister’s major economic address. 
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Table 1: Indicators of Growth in Downtown Manhattan, summer 2014 to summer 2015 
 
                 2014, 3rd quarter 2015, 3rd quarter % increase 
Annual visitors   9.6 million  12.4 million  29.2% 
Hotel rooms   4,681   5,225   11.6 
Annual spending power  $5.2 billion  $5.8 billion  11.5 
Student residences  1,850   2,620   41.6 
Average daily PATH riders 34,510   40,411   17.1 
Average daily ferry riders 85,162   91,965   8.0 
Average weekday subway 310,254  344,280  11.0 
Commercial square footage 85.6 million  87.8 million  2.6 
Private sector employees 224,806  225,038*  0.1 
Number of residents  61,000   62,000   1.7 
 
Source: Downtown Alliance, 2015. 
*From 2016 Q1 Indicators. 
  
Table 2: New York City Department of Transportation Pedestrian Counts, 2014 and 2015 





2015 % change 
Sep. 




12,666 14,507 +14.5 16,251 13,111 -19.3 
Chambers, from 
W. B’w’y to 
Greenwich 
10,248 9689 -5.5 10,478 9256 -11.7 
Chambers, from 
W. B’w’y to 
Greenwich 








7732 8002 +3.5 7212 7037 -2.4 
Trinity, Rector to 
Thames 
4504 5964 +32.4 5095 5592 +9.75 
 
    
Source: New York City Department of Transportation, “Bi-annual pedestrian index.”   
Accessed at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dot/html/about/datafeeds.shtml#Pedestrians 
  
  
Table 3a: Total Metrocard Swipes 
     
    2014 2015 % change 
TOTAL  25376654 26410283 4% 
     
TOURIST ZONE     
RECTOR STREET-CHURCH STREET    219139 491594 124% 
BROAD STREET & WALL STREET     434776 476297 10% 
BOWLING GREEN & BROADWAY       591555 423479 -28% 
RECTOR STREET-GREENWICH ST     863343 752454 -13% 
BOWLING GREEN & BATTERY PL     2078247 1826167 -12% 
WHITEHALL STREET                1624472 2108126 30% 
PA-PATH WORLD TRADE CNTR       1116111 1446314 30% 
SUBTOTAL  6927643 7524431 9% 
     
NON-TOURIST ZONE     
BROOKLYN BRIDGE                2844231 2694655 -5% 
CHAMBERS STREET                1643002 1678013 2% 
PARK PLACE                      4121366 4396832 7% 
CITY HALL                       246435 486265 97% 
FULTON STREET                  3046362 3607124 18% 
WALL STREET                    4099723 3777552 -8% 
FULTON & WILLIAM STREETS 















(May 31 to 
Sep 5) 
2015 
(May 30 to 
Sep 4) % change 
TOTAL 12461055 12866437 3% 
    
TOURIST ZONE    
RECTOR STREET-CHURCH STREET    97719 221306 126% 
BROAD STREET & WALL STREET     189536 196072 3% 
BOWLING GREEN & BROADWAY       276290 196277 -29% 
RECTOR STREET-GREENWICH ST     424233 362013 -15% 
BOWLING GREEN & BATTERY PL     901884 778760 -14% 
WHITEHALL STREET               835889 993726 19% 
PA-PATH WORLD TRADE CNTR       1038007 1352369 30% 
SUBTOTAL 3763558 4100523 9% 
    
NON-TOURIST ZONE    
BROOKLYN BRIDGE                1276154 1173119 -8% 
CHAMBERS STREET                744702 754978 1% 
PARK PLACE                     2142313 2269199 6% 
CITY HALL                      110351 214503 94% 
FULTON STREET                  1477030 1696082 15% 
WALL STREET                    1894839 1718342 -9% 










Table 3c: 30-Day Metrocard Swipes 
    
  
2014 
(May 31 to 
Sep 5) 
2015 
(May 30 to 
Sep 4) % change 
TOTAL 6616150 6703971 1% 
    
TOURIST ZONE    
RECTOR STREET-CHURCH STREET    63414 143930 127% 
BROAD STREET & WALL STREET     131938 141299 7% 
BOWLING GREEN & BROADWAY       107596 76816 -29% 
RECTOR STREET-GREENWICH ST     220931 193272 -13% 
BOWLING GREEN & BATTERY PL     585554 503211 -14% 
WHITEHALL STREET               301734 469039 55% 
PA-PATH WORLD TRADE CNTR       NA NA NA 
SUBTOTAL 1411167 1527567 8% 
    
NON-TOURIST ZONE    
BROOKLYN BRIDGE                792302 742405 -6% 
CHAMBERS STREET                458643 446255 -3% 
PARK PLACE                     1030182 1047076 2% 
CITY HALL                      73397 143029 95% 
FULTON STREET                  813079 969553 19% 
WALL STREET                    1258560 1141815 -9% 
FULTON & WILLIAM STREETS  













East Broadway 1.44 2.13 
West Broadway 3.55 3.32 
Crossover 0.40 1.34 
Northwest 3.71 1.77 
Total 9.10 8.56 
 
 
Note: Missing observations were replaced by the mean panhandler count of all other 
observations of that block in that year 
Table 5:  Number of panhandlers as a function of year: Poisson regression 8(ln 9:;%) = / + 0<;% + =: + >% + :;% 
 
   
 count count 
Rain Dummy -0.271 -0.077 
 (0.192) (0.174) 
Max Temperature 0.075 0.001 
 (0.055) (0.044) 
Max Temperature Squared -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Year Dummy = 1 for 2015 0.147 -0.277 
 (0.252) (0.190) 
Hour Fixed Effects Yes No 
   
Day of Week Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
   
Week Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
   
Block Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
   
Constant -7.673** -2.462 
 (2.112) (1.724) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.2596 0.2285 
Number of Observations 2,405 2,405 
LR chi2 475.84 418.84 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
 
  
Table 6: Average Number of Panhandlers by Zone by Year 
 
 
Zone 2014 2015 
Tourist 0.65 1.12 
Broadway 3.65 3.08 
Other 2.41 2.74 
Total 6.95 6.81 
 
 
Note: Missing observations were replaced by the average for all other block-fronts in 
that zone for that year.  




Rain Dummy -0.265 
 (0.171) 
Max Temperature 0.063 
 (0.051) 
Max Temperature Squared -0.000 
 (0.000) 
Tourist zone*Dummy2015 0.696* 
 (0.309) 
Broadway zone*Dummy2015 -0.281 
 (0.349) 
Other zone*Dummy2015 0.261 
 (0.266) 
Block Fixed Effects Yes 
  
Hour Fixed Effects Yes 
  
Day Fixed Effects Yes 
  




Pseudo R-squared 0.2628 
Number of Observations 2,398 
Wald chi2(116) 52877.87 
Prob > chi2 0.000 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
 
  
Table 8a: Number of panhandlers as a function of intuitive score: Poisson regression 
  
count 
Rain dummy -0.244 
(0.188) 
Max Temperature 0.068 
(0.052) 
Max Temperature Squared -0.000 
(0.000) 
Hour Fixed Effects 
 
Yes 
Day Fixed Effects 
 
Yes 
Week Fixed Effects 
 
Yes 




















Pseudo R-squared 0.2594 
No. of Observations 2,405 
LR chi2(114) 475.50 
Prob > chi2 0.000 








Rain dummy -0.227 
(0.187) 
Max Temperature 0.070 
(0.050) 
Max Temperature Squared -0.000 
(0.000) 
Hour Fixed Effects 
 
Yes 
Day Fixed Effects 
 
Yes 
Week Fixed Effects 
 
Yes 
Block rating = 6 1.795a 
(0.274) 
Block rating = 5 0.961a 
(0.288) 
Block rating = 4 1.129a 
(0.275) 




Pseudo R-squared 0.1107 
No. of Observations 2,365 
Wald chi2(47) 4732.91 
Prob > chi2 0.000 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
 
  
Table 9a: Number of Blocks by Intuitive Score 
 
Block Intuition No. of Blocks 






Table 9b: Number of Blocks by Structured Score 
 







Table 10a: Poisson Regression of Panhandling Measuring Effects of Nearby Block Fronts 
 Using Structured Score (1)ln 9:? = / + 0@? + A8: + 34:B:? + (1 − 4:)C:? + :? 
(2) ln 9:? = / + 0@? + A8: + 34:B:? + (1 − 4:)C:? + =4:D:? + >(1 − 4:)E:? + :? 
 count count 
 (1) (2) 
Rain Dummy -0.387* -0.391* 
 (0.170) (0.170) 
Max Temperature 0.094+        0.095+ 
 (0.049) (0.049) 
Max Temperature Squared -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Structured score 0.349** 0.371** 
 (0.049) (0.051) 4:B:? Occupied neighbors (interior) -0.285+ -0.306* 
 (0.151) (0.151) (1 − 4:)C:? Occupied neighbor (not interior) 0.343 3.180 
 (1.797) (2.627) 4:D:? Attractive neighbors (interior)  - -0.144* 
  (0.060) (1 − 4:)E:? Attractive neighbor (not 
interior) 
- -0.197* 
  (0.082) 
Week Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
   
Hour Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
   
Constant -9.077** -8.636** 
 (1.785) (1.796) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1032  
Number of Observations 2,365 2,365 
LR chi2 185.93 193.16 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
 
  
Table 10b: Using Intuitive Score (1)ln 9:? = / + 0@? + A8: + 34:B:? + (1 − 4:)C:? + :? 
(2) ln 9:? = / + 0@? + A8: + 34:B:? + (1 − 4:)C:? + =4:D:? + >(1 − 4:)E:? + :? 
 count count 
 (1) (2) 
Rain Dummy -0.355* -0.358* 
 (0.169) (0.169) 
Max Temperature 0.090+         0.091+ 
 (0.049) (0.049) 
Max Temperature Squared -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000)   (0.000) 
Intuitive score 0.441** 0.440** 
 (0.056) (0.056) 4:B:? Occupied neighbors (interior) -0.245 -0.260+ 
 (0.156) (0.157) (1 − 4:)C:? Occupied neighbor (not interior) 2.468 4.875+ 
 (1.815) (2.645) 4:D:? Attractive neighbors (interior) - -0.021 
  (0.077) (1 − 4:)E:? Attractive neighbor (not interior) - -0.132   
  (0.110) 
Week Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
   
Hour Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
   
Constant -8.321** -8.295** 
 (1.770) (1.773) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1078 0.1088 
Number of Observations 2,365 2,365 
LR chi2 194.27 196.07 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 





Number of panhandlers by year: Logistic regression 
 
   
 count count 
Rain Dummy -0.254 0.016 
 (0.240) (0.218) 
Max Temperature 0.123+ 0.023 
 (0.067) (0.055) 
Max Temperature Squared -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) 
Year Dummy = 1 for 2015 0.102 -0.405+ 
 (0.295) (0.225) 
Hour Fixed Effects Yes No 
   
Day of Week Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
   
Week Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
   
Block Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
   
Constant -9.113 -2.471 
 (2.488) (1.989) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.2485 0.2092 
Number of Observations 1,984 1,984 
LR chi2 (100) 380.11 319.93 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 









Rain Dummy -0.228 
 (0.240) 
Max Temperature 0.108 
 (0.070) 
Max Temperature Squared -0.001 
 (0.001) 
Tourist zone*Dummy2015 0.657 
 (0.423) 
Broadway zone*Dummy2015 -0.356 
 (0.423) 
Other zone*Dummy2015 0.253 
 (0.337) 
Block Fixed Effects Yes 
  
Hour Fixed Effects Yes 
  
Day Fixed Effects Yes 
  




Pseudo R-squared 0.2504 
Number of Observations 1,984 
Wald chi2(102) 337.62 
Prob > chi2 0.000 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
 
